Grounding, Transitivity, and Contrastivity forthcoming, Grounding and Explanation, eds. Correia and Schnieder: Cambridge Synopsis: Counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding, plus sketch of a contrastive resolution Topics: Grounding
Why the World has Parts: Reply to Horgan & Potrc forthcoming, Spinoza on Monism, ed. Goff: Palgrave Synopsis: Reply to Horgan & Potrc's defense of existence monism over priority monism Topics: Monism
Necessitarian Propositions forthcoming, Synthese Synopsis: Is there any good reason to think that propositions are eternal (time-specific), which does not provide parallel reason to think that propositions are necessary (world-specific)? Topics: Semantics, Propositions
Epistemic Comparativism: A Contextualist Semantics for Knowledge Ascriptions (with ZoltánGendler Szabó) forthcoming, Philosophical Studies Synopsis: Attempt to provide a plausible semantics for epistemic contextualism, on the model of adverbial quantification Topics: Semantics, Contextualism, Contrastive knowledge
Contrastive Knowledge: Reply to Baumann forthcoming, The
Concept of Knowledge, ed. Tolksdorf:
De Gruyter Synopsis: Reply to Baumann's critical discussion of my "Contrastive Knowledge" Topics: Contrastive knowledge
Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed (with Joshua Knobe) forthcoming, Noûs Synopsis: Discussion of existing experimental results on knowledge ascriptions, and new results favoring a contrastive model Topics: Experimental philosophy, Contrastive knowledge
Perspective in Taste Predicates and Epistemic ModalsEpistemic Modality, eds. Egan and Weatherson (2011), 179-226: Oxford Synopsis: Defense of a contextualist view of taste predicates and epistemic modals Topics: Semantics, Contextualism
Causal Contextualism forthcoming, Contrastivism in Philosophy, ed. Blaauw: Routledge Synopsis: Argument that the context sensitivity of causal ascriptions is best understood in a contrastive framework Topics: Contextualism, Contrastive causation
Contrastive Causation in the LawLegal Theory 16 (2010), 259-97 Synopsis: Application of the contrastive view of causation to causation in the law (with a focus on liability in common law) Topics: Contrastive causation, Causation in the law
The Internal Relatedness of All ThingsMind 119
(2010), 341-76 Synopsis: Attempt to revive the core neo-Hegelian argument for monism, based on universal internal relatedness Topics: Monism
The Debasing DemonAnalysis 70 (2010), 228-37 Synopsis: Discussion of skeptical doubts involving the basing requirement, imperiling even the Cartesian cogito Topics: Skepticism
The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker Philosophical
Quarterly 60 (2010), 307-24 Synopsis: Defense of the idea that the world is the one and only (ultimate) truthmaker Topics: Truthmaking, Monism
Monism: The Priority of the Whole Philosophical Review 119.1 (2010), 31-76
(to be reprinted in Spinoza on Monism, ed.
Goff (forthcoming): Palgrave) Synopsis: Discussion of the issue between (priority) monists and pluralists, and defense of (priority) monism Topics: Monism
The Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson's Ordinary ObjectsPhilosophical Books 50.3 (2009), 142-157 Synopsis: Critical discussion of Thomasson's book, arguing for a grounding-based metaontology (as in "On What Grounds What") over a deflationary metaontology Topics: Meta-metaphysics
Spacetime the One SubstancePhilosophical Studies 145.1 (2009), 131-48 Synopsis: Arguments for monistic substantivalism (supersubstantivalism) over dualistic substantivalism (substantival spacetime plus distinct material substances) Topics: Spacetime, Monism
Knowing the Answer Redux: Replies to Brogaard and KallestrupPhilosophy and Phenomenological
Research 78.2 (2009), 477-500 Synopsis: Replies to Brogaard's and Kallestrup's critical discussions of my "Knowing the Answer" Topics: Contrastive knowledge, Knowledge-wh
On What Grounds WhatMetametaphysics, eds.
Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman (2009), 347-83: Oxford (selected as one of the ten best articles
published in philosophy in 2009 and reprinted by Philosopher’s Annual) Synopsis: Conception of metaphysics as primarily concerned with questions of grounding rather than existence Topics: Meta-metaphysics, Grounding
Knowledge in the Image of AssertionPhilosophical Issues 18.1 (2008), 1-19 Synopsis: Stalnaker's view of the nature of assertion + Williamsons's knowledge account of assertion = my contrastive view of knowledge Topics: Assertion, Contrastive knowledge
Truth and Fundamentality: On Merrick's Truth and OntologyPhilosophical Books 49.4 (2008), 302-16 Synopsis: Critical discussion of Merrick's book, arguing for an understanding of truthmaking via grounding rather than necessitation Topics: Truthmaking, Grounding
The Contrast Sensitivity of Knowledge AscriptionsSocial Epistemology 22.3
(2008), 235-45 Synopsis: Can a binary (non-contrastive) account of knowledge explain the contrast sensitivity of knowledge ascriptions? Topics: Contrastive knowledge
Review of Hüttemann's What's Wrong with Microphysicalism?British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59.2 (2008), 253-57 Synopsis: Review of Hüttemann's book, arguing that the main arguments support monism (macrophysicalism) rather than Hüttemann's own egalitarian view Topics: Physicalism, Monism
Truthmaker CommitmentsPhilosophical Studies 141.1 (2008), 7-19 Synopsis: Distinction between existence commitments (quantification) and fundamentality commitments (truthmaking) Topics: Truthmaking, Ontological commitment
MonismStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007), <plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism> Synopsis: Overview of metaphysical monisms, and discussions of existence monism (exactly one thing exists) and priority monism (exactly one thing is fundamental) Topics: Monism
Causation and Laws of Nature: ReductionismContemporary Debates in Metaphysics, eds. Hawthorne, Sider,
and Zimmerman (2007), 82-107: Blackwell Synopsis: Undergraduate level review of some main arguments for and against treating causation and laws as fundamental Topics: Causation, Lawhood, Humeanism
Knowing the AnswerPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 75.2 (2007), 383-403
(awarded APA Article Prize, 2008) Synopsis: Argument for a contrastive view of knowledge based on knowledge-wh constructions Topics: Contrastive knowledge, Knowledge-wh
From Nihilism to MonismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 85.2 (2007), 175-91 (awarded
AJP Best Paper Award, 2008) Synopsis: Arguments that the mereological nihilist should prefer one big extended simple (existence monism) over many small simples Topics: Mereology, Monism
Closure, Contrast, and AnswerPhilosophical Studies 133.2 (2007), 233-55 Synopsis: How should a contrastivist understand epistemic closure? Topics: Contrastive knowledge, Epistemic closure
Deterministic Chance?British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58.2 (2007),
113-40 Synopsis: Arguments that determinism is incompatible with robust objective chances (other than 0 or 1) Topics: Determinism, chance
Contrastive CausationPhilosophical Review 114.3 (2005), 327-58 Synopsis: Defense of a (doubly) contrastive view of causation, on which causal relations have the form: c rather than C* causes e rather than E* Topics: Contrastive causation
Contrastive KnowledgeOxford Studies in Epistemology1, eds. Gendler and Hawthorne (2005), 235-71: Oxford (to be reprinted in The Concept of Knowledge, ed. Tolksdorf (forthcoming): De Gruyter) Synopsis: Defense of, a contrastive view of knowledge, on which the knowledge relation has the form: s knows that p rather than q Topics: Contrastive knowledge
What Shifts? Thresholds, Standards, or Alternatives?Contextualism in Philosophy, eds. Preyer and Peter (2005), 115-30: Oxford Synopsis: Arguments that contextualists should work with relevant alternatives rather than thresholds for justification (Cohen) or distance of tracking (DeRose) Topics: Contextualism
Quiddistic KnowledgePhilosophical Studies 123.1-2
(2005), 1-32 (reprinted in Lewisian Themes:
The Philosophy of David K. Lewis,eds. Jackson and
Priest (2004), 210-30: Oxford) Synopsis: Is the relation between properties and powers contingent or necessary, and if contingent how can we know what the properties are? Topics: Properties, Knowledge
From Contextualism to ContrastivismPhilosophical
Studies 119.1 (2004), 73-103
Synopsis: Arguments for a contrastive view of knowledge as resolving problems for (indexicalist) contextualism Topics: Contextualism, Contrastive Knowledge
Counterfactuals, Causal Independence, and Conceptual CircularityAnalysis 64.4 (2004),
299-309 Synopsis: Sketch of a Lewisian view of counterfactuals with causal information in the similarity metric, and discussion of whether any problematic circularity looms Topics: Counterfactuals, Conceptual analysis
Two Conceptions of Sparse PropertiesPacific Philosophical Quarterly 85.1 (2004),
92-102 Synopsis: Are the sparse properties the fundamental properties or the scientific (including higher-level) properties? Topics: Properties
Of Ghostly and Mechanical EventsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 68.1
(2004), 230-44 Synopsis: Critical discussion of Pietroski's Causing Actions, defending a non-reductive layered metaphysics Topics: Philosophy of Mind, Reductionism
Skepticism, Contextualism, and DiscriminationPhilosophy and
Phenomenological Research 69.1 (2004), 138-55 (awarded Young Epistemologist
Prize, 2002) Synopsis: Argument that skepticism plus Gricean mechanisms (involving hyperbole) can explain knowledge ascriptions better than Lewisian contextualism Topics: Skepticism, Contextualism
The Metaphysics of CausationStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2003, revised 2007), <plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics>
Synopsis: Overview of metaphysical issues concerning the causal relata and the causal relation Topics: Causation
Is There a Fundamental Level?Noûs 37.3 (2003), 498-517 Synopsis: Defense of the possibility of gunk and discussion of its reprecussions for reductive metaphysics Topics: Mereology, Reductionism
Overdetermining CausesPhilosophical Studies 114.1
(2003), 23-45 Synopsis: Arguments that each individual overdetermining factor is causal Topics: Causation, Overdetermination
The Problem of Free Mass: Must Properties Cluster?Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 66.1 (2003), 125-38 Synopsis: Can a thing have mass but no other property? The question of whether there are necessary connections between properties Topics: Properties
Principled ChancesBritish Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 54.2 (2003), 27-41 Synopsis: Account of chance that is Humean, while avoiding undermining and allowing non-zero chances to be realizable (but is not quite the quantity found in the laws, and is not stable across duplicate trials) Topics: Chance, Humeanism
Causes as Probability-Raisers of ProcessesJournal of Philosophy 98.2 (2001),
75-92 Synopsis: Proposed analysis of causation via raising the probability of the effect-process, attempting to synthesize probability-raising and process-linkage views Topics: Causation
Causation, Influence, and EffluenceAnalysis 61.4 (2001), 11-19 Synopsis: Criticism of Lewis's influence account of causation Topics: Causation
The Individuation of TropesAustralasian
Journal of Philosophy 79.2 (2001), 247-57 Synopsis: Argument that trope theorists should individuate tropes by location Topics: Tropes
Knowledge, Relevant Alternatives, and Missed CluesAnalysis 61.3 (2001), 202-8 Synopsis: Counterexample to Lewis's account of knowledge (perhaps best resolved by a requirement of properly based belief) Topics: Causation
Review of Dowe's Physical CausationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52.4 (2001), 809-13 Synopsis: Review of Dowe's book Topics: Causation
Causation by DisconnectionPhilosophy of Science 67.2 (2000), 285-300 (awarded Philosophy of Science Recent Ph.D. Essay Contest,
2001) Synopsis: Argument for a specific sort of absence causation, making trouble for process-linkage accounts of causation Topics: Causation, Absence causation
Overlappings: Probability-Raising without CausationAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 78.1 (2000), 40-46 Synopsis: Counterexample to the sufficiency of probability-raising accounts of causation Topics: Causation
Trumping PreemptionJournal of Philosophy 97.4 (2000), 165-81 (reprinted in Causation and Counterfactuals, eds. Collins, Hall, and Paul (2004), 59-73: MIT Press) Synopsis: A special sort of preemption counterexample to counterfactual accounts of causation Topics: Causation
